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Respondent was a senior manager and an officer in an office of petitioner
professional accounting partnership when she was proposed for partnership in 1982. She was neither offered nor denied partnership but instead her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year.
When the partners in her office later refused to repropose her for partnership, she sued petitioner in Federal District under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act), charging that it had discriminated against
her on the basis of sex in its partnership decisions. The District Court
ruled in respondent's favor on the question of liability, holding that petitioner had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of sex by
consciously giving credence and effect to partners' comments about her
that resulted from sex stereotyping. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Both courts held that an employer who has allowed a discriminatory motive to play a part in an employment decision must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination, and that petitioner had not carried this burden.
Heul: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
263 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 825 F . 2d 458, reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS, concluded that when a plaintiff in a Title
VII case proves that her gender played a part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account. The courts
below erred by requiring petitioner to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence. Pp. 7-28.
(a) The balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives
established by Title VII by eliminating certain bases for distinguishing
I
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among employees while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of
choice is decisive in this case. The words ''because of" in § 703(a)(l) of
the Act, which forbids an employer to make an adverse decision against
an employee ''because of such individual's ... sex,'' requires looking at
all of the reasons, both legitimate and illegitimate, contributing to the
decision at the time it is made. The preservation of employers' freedom
of choice means that an employer will not be liable if it can prove that, if
it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same
decision. This Court's prior decisions demonstrate that the plaintiff
who shows that an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an
adverse employment decision thereby places the burden on the defendant to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of
the unlawful motive. Here, petitioner may not meet its burden by
merely showing that respondent's interpersonal problems-abrasiveness
with staff members-constituted a legitimate reason for denying her
partnership; instead, petitioner must show that its legitimate reason,
standing alone, would have induced petitioner to deny respondent partnership. Pp. 8-22.
(b) Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII
cases, and one of these rules is that the parties need only prove their
case by a preponderance of the evidence. Pp. 22-25.
(c) The District Court's finding that sex stereotyping was permitted
to play a part in evaluating respondent as a candidate for partnership
was not clearly erroneous. This finding is not undermined by the fact
that many of the suspect comments made about respondent were made
by partners who were supporters rather than detractors. Pp. 25-28.
JUSTICE WHITE, although concluding that the Court of Appeals efred
in requiring petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the
improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance
of the evidence as in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U. S. 274, which sets forth the proper approach to causation in this
case, also concluded that the plurality here errs in seeming to require, at
least in most cases, that the employer carry its burden by submitting objective evidence that the same result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation. In a mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive
found would have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken for the
legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof, and there is no special requirement of objective evidence. This would even more plainly be
the case where the employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first
place but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors
motivated the adverse action. Pp. 1-3.
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JUSTICE O'CoNNOR, although agreeing that on the facts of this case,
th~ burden of persuasion should shift to petitioner to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision absent consideration of respondent's gender, and that this burden
shift is properly part of the liability phase of the litigation, concluded
that the plurality misreads Title VII's substantive causation requirement to command burden shifting if the employer's decisional process is
"tainted" by awareness of sex or race in any way, and thereby effectively
eliminates the requirement. JUSTICE O'CONNOR also concluded that the
burden shifting rule should be limited to cases such as the present in
which the employer has created uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. Pp. 1-19.
(a) Contrary to the plurality's conclusion, Title VII's plain language
making it unlawful for an employer to undertake an adverse emplpyment
action ''because of" prohibited factors and the statute's legislative history
demonstrate that a substantive violation only occurs when consideration
of an illegitimate criterion is the ''but-for'' cause of the adverse action.
However, nothing in the language, history, or purpose of the statute
prohibits adoption of an evidentiary rule which places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to demonstrate that legitimate concerns would
have justified an adverse employment action where the plaintiff has convinced the factfinder that a forbidden factor played a substantial role in
the employment decision. Such a rule has been adopted in tort and
other analogous types of cases, where leaving the burden of proof on the
plaintiff to prove ''but-for" causation would be unfair or contrary to the
deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care. Pp. 2-9.
(b) Although the burden shifting rule adopted here departs from the
careful framework established by McDonnell Dougla.s Corp. v. Green,
411 U. S. 792, and Texas Dept. of Community Affafrs v. Burdine, 450
U. S. 248-which clearly contemplate that an individual disparate treatment plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the litigationthat departure is justified in cases such as the present where the plaintiff, having presented direct evidence that the employer placed substantial, though unquantifiable, reliance on a forbidden factor in making an
employment decision, has taken her proof as far as it could go, such that
it is appropriate to require the defendant, which has created the uncertainty as to causation by considering the illegitimate criterion, to show
that its decision would have been justified by wholly legitimate concerns.
Moreover, a rule shifting the burden in these circumstances will not conflict with other Title VII policies, particularly its prohibition on preferential treatment based on prohibited factors. Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.-, distinguished. Pp. 9-15.
·
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(c) Thus, in order to justify shifting the burden on the causation issue
to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision. Such a showing entitles
the factflnder to presume that the employer's discriminatory animus
made a difference in the outcome, and, if the employer fails to carry its
burden of persuasion, to conclude that the employer's decision was made
''because of" consideration of the illegitimate factor, thereby satisfying
the substantive standard for liability under Title VII. This burden
shifting rule supplements the McDonnell D011glas-Burdine framework,
which continues to apply where the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
threshold standard set forth herein. Pp. 16-18.
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an
opinion, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined.
WHITE, J., and O'CONNOR, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and
SCALIA, J., joined.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 87-1167
PRICE WATERHOU SE, PETITIONE R v. ANN B.
HOPKINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
_ APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[May 1, 1989]

JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court
and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE MARSHALL, JusTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join.
. Ann Hopkins was a senior manager in an office of Price
Waterhouse when -she was proposed for partnership in 1982.
She was neither offered nor denied admission to the partnership; instead, her candidacy was held for reconsideration the
following year. When the partners in her office later refused to repropose her for partnership, she sued Price
Waterhouse under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., charging that the firm had discriminated against her on the basis of
sex in its decisions regarding partnership. Judge Gesell in
the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in her
favor on the question of liability, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (1985),
and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed. 263 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 825 F. 2d 458 (1987).
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts
of Appeals concerning the respective burdens of proof of a defendant_and plaintiff in a suit under Title VII when it has
been shown that an employment decision resulted from a
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives. 485 U. S.
-(1988).
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I
At Price Waterhouse, a nationwide professional accounting
partnership, a senior manager becomes a candidate for partnership when the partners in her local office submit her name
as a candidate. All of the other partners in the firm are then
invited to submit written comments on each candidate- ·
either on a "long" or a "short" form, depending on the partner's degree of exposure to the candidate. Not every partner in the firm submits comments on every candidate. After
reviewing the comments and interviewing the partners who
submitted them, the firm's Admissions Committee makes a
recommendation to the Policy Board. This recommendation
will be either that the firm accept the candidate for partnership, put her application on "hold," or deny her the promotion
outright. The Policy Board then decides whether to submit
the candidate's name to the entire partnership for a vote, to
"hold" her candidacy, or to reject her. The recommendation
of the Admissions Committee, and the decision of the Policy
Board, are not controlled by fixed guidelines: a certain number of positive comments from partners will not guarantee a
candidate's admission to the partnership, nor will a specific
quantity of negative comments necessarily defeat her application. Price Waterhouse places no limit on the number of
persons whom it will admit to the partnership in any given
year.
Ann Hopkins· had worked at Price Waterhouse's Office of
Government Services in Washington, D. C., for five years
when the partners in that office proposed her as a candidate
for partnership. Of the 662 partners at the firm at that time,
7 were women. Of the 88 persons proposed for partnership
that year, only I-Hopkins-was a woman. Forty-seven of
these candidates were admitted to the partnership, 21 were
rejected, and 20-including Hopkins-were ''held" for reconsideration the following year. 1 Thirteen of the 32 partBefore the time for reconsideration crune, two of the partners in Hopkins' office withdrew their support for her, and the office informed her that
she would not be reconsidered for partnership. Hopkins then resigned.
1
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ners who had submitted comments on Hopkins supported her
bid for partnership. Three partners recommended that her
candidacy be placed on hold, eight stated that they did not
have an informed opinion about her, and eight recommended
that she be denied partnership.
In a jointly prepared statement supporting her candidacy,
the partners in Hopkins' office showcased her successful 2year effort to secure a $25 million contract with the Department of State, labeling it "an outstanding performance" and
one that Hopkins carried out "virtually at the partner level."
Plaintiff's Exh. 15. Despite Price Waterhouse's attempt at
t:rial to minimize her contribution to this project, Judge Gesell specifically found that Hopkins had "played a key role in
Price Waterhouse's successful effort to win a multi-million
dollar contract with the Department of State." 618 F.
Supp., at 1112. Indeed, he went on, "[n]one of the other
partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a
comparable record in terms of successfully securing major
contracts for the partnership." Ibid.
The partners in Hopkins' office praised her character as
well as her accomplishments, describing her in their joint
statement as "an outstanding professional" who had a "deft
touch," a "strong character, independence and integrity."
Plaintiff's Exh. 15. Clients appear to have agreed with
these assessments. At trial, one official from the State Department described her as "extremely competent, intelligent," "strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and
creative." Tr. 150. Another high-ranking official praised
Hopkins' decisiveness, broadmindedness, and "intellectual
Price Waterhouse does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
the refusal to repropose her for partnership amounted to a constructive
discharge. That court remanded the case to the District Court for further
proceedings to determine appropriate relief, and those proceedings have
been stayed pending our decision. Brief for Petitioner 15, n. 3. We are
concerned today only with Price Waterhouse's decision to place Hopkins'
candidacy on hold. Decisions pertaining to advancement to partnership
are, of course, subject to challenge under Title VII. Hishon v. King &
S'J)O,l,ding, 467 U. S. 69 (1984).
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clarity''; she was, in his words, "a stimulating conversationalist." Id., at 156-157. Evaluations such as these led Judge
Gesell to conclude that Hopkins ''had no difficulty dealing
with clients and her clients appear to have been very pleased
with her work'' and that she "was generally viewed as a
highly competent project leader who worked long hours,
pushed vigorously to meet deadlines and demanded much
from the multidisciplinary staffs with which she worked."
618 F. Supp., at 1112-1113.
On too many occasions, however, Hopkins' aggressiveness
apparently spilled over into abrasiveness. Staff members
seem to have borne the brunt of Hopkins' brusqueness.
Long before her bid for partnership, partners evaluating her
work had counseled her to improve her relations with staff
members. Although later evaluations indicate an improvement, Hopkins' perceived shortcomings in this important
area eventually doomed her bid for partnership. Virtually
all of the partners' negative remarks about Hopkins-even
those of partners supporting her-had to do with her "interpersonal skills." Both "[s]upporters and opponents of her
candidacy," stressed Judge Gesell, "indicated that she was
sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work
with and impatient with staff." Id., at 1113.
There were clear signs, though, that some of the partners
reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality because she was a
woman. One partner described her as "macho" (Defendant's
Exh. 30);. another suggested that she "overcompensated for
being a woman" (Defendant's Exh. 31); a third advised her to
take "a course at charm school" (Defendant's Exh. 27). Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one
partner suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only ''because it[']s a lady using foul language." Tr. 321.
Another supporter explained that Hopkins ''ha[d] matured
from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr to
an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady
ptr candidate." Defendant's Exh. 27. But it was the man
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who, as ,Judge Gesell found, bore responsibility for explaining
to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's decision to
place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de grace:
in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas
Beyer advised, Hopkins should "walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 618 F. Supp., at 1117.
Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist and Associate Professor of Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University, testified
at trial that the partnership selection process at Price
Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping. Her
testimony focused not only on the overtly sex-based comments of partners but also on gender-neutral remarks, made
by partners who knew Hopkins only slightly, that were intensely critical of her. One partner, for example, baldly
stated that Hopkins was "universally disliked" by staff (Defendant's Exh. 27), and another described her as "consistently annoying and irritating" (ibid.); yet these were people
who had had very little contact with Hopkins. According to
Fiske, Hopkins' uniqueness (as the only woman in the pool of
candidates) and the subjectivity of the evaluations made it
likely that sharply critical remarks such as these were the
product of sex stereotyping-although Fiske admitted that
she could not say with certainty whether any particular comment was the result of stereotyping. Fiske based her opinion on a review of the submitted comments, explaining that it
was commonly accepted practice for social psychologists to
reach this kind of conclusion without having met any of the
people involved in the decisionmaking process.
In previous years, other female candidates for partnership
also had been evaluated in sex-based terms. As a general
matter, Judge Gesell concluded, "[c]andidates were viewed
favorably if partners believed they maintained their femin[in]ity while becoming effective professional managers"; in
this environment, "[t]o be identified as a 'women's lib[b]er'
was regarded as [a] negative comment." 618 F . Supp., at
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1117. In fact, the judge found that in previous years "[o]ne
partner repeatedly commented that he could not consider any
woman seriously as a partnership candidate and believed that
women were not even capable of functioning as senior managers -yet the firm took no action to discourage his comments
and recorded his vote in the overall summary of the evaluations. " Ibid.
Judge Gesell found that Price Waterhouse legitimately emphasized interpersonal skills in its partnership decisions, and
also found that the firm had not fabricated its complaints
about Hopkins' interpersonal skills as a pretext for discrimination. Moreover, he concluded, the firm did not give
decisive emphasis to such traits only because Hopkins was a
woman; although there were male candidates who lacked
these skills but who were admitted to partnership, the judge
found that these candidates possessed other, positive traits
that Hopkins lacked.
The judge went on to decide, however, that some of the
partners' remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women, and
that Price Waterhouse had done nothing to disavow reliance
on such comments. He held that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by
consciously giving credence and effect to partners' comments
that resulted from sex stereotyping. Noting that Price
Waterhouse could avoid equitable relief by proving by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have placed Hopkins'
candidacy on hold even absent this discrimination, the judge
decided that the firm had not carried this heavy burden.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District court's ultimate
conclusion, but departed from its analysis in one particular: it
held that even if a plaintiff proves that discrimination played
a role in an employment decision, the defendant will not be
found liable if it proves, by clear and convincing evidence,
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of
discrimination. 263 U. S. App. D. C., at 333-334, 825 F . 2d,
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at 470-471. Under this approach, an employer is not
deemed to have violated Title VII if it proves that it would
have made the same decision in the absence of an impermissible motive, whereas under the District Court's approach, the
employer's proof in that respect only avoids equitable relief.
We decide today that the Court of Appeals had the better approach, but that both courts erred in requiring the employer
to make its proof by clear and convincing evidence.
II
The specification of the standard of causation under Title
VII is a decision about the kind of conduct that violates that
statute. According to Price Waterhouse, an employer violates Title VII only if it gives decisive consideration to an employee's gender, race, national origin, or religion in making a
decision that affects that employee. On Price Waterhouse's
theory, even if a plaintiff shows that her gender played a part
in an employment decision, it is still her burden to show that
the decision would have been different if the employer had
not discriminated. In Hopkins' view, on the other hand, an
employer violates the statute whenever it allows one of these
attributes to play any part in an employment decision. Once
a plaintiff shows that this occurred, according to Hopkins,
the employer's proof that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination can serve to limit equitable relief but not to avoid a finding ofliability. 2 We conclude
that, as often happens, the truth lies somewhere in-between.
• This question has, to say the least, left the Circuits in disarray. The
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits require a plaintiff challenging
an adverse employment decision to show that, but for her gender (or race
or religion or national origin), the decision would have been in her favor.
See, e. g., Belli8simo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F. 2d 175, 179
(CA3 1985), cert. denied, 475 U. S. 1035 (1986); Ross v. Comrm.tnication.s
Satellite Corp., 759 F. 2d 355, 365-366 (CA41985); Peters v.City of Sh1·eveport, 818 F. 2d 1148, 1161(CA51987); McQuillen v. Wi8con.sin Editeation
Assn. Council, 830 F. 2d 659, 664-665 (CA7 1987). The First, Second,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, hold that once the plaintiff
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In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national
origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees. 3 Yet, the statute does not purport
to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers
may take into account in making employment decisions.
has shown that a discriminatory motive was a "substantial" or "motivating"
factor in an employment decision, the employer may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even in
the absence of discrimination. These courts have either specified that the
employer must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence or have
not mentioned the proper standard of proof. See, e. g., Fields v. Clark
University, 817 F. 2d 931, 936-937 (CAl 1987) ("motivating factor"); Berl
v. Westchester County, 849 F. 2d 712, 714-715 (CA2 1988) ("substantial
part"); Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, Ky., 825 F. 2d 111, 115
(CA6 1987) ("motivating factor"); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715
F . 2d 1552, 1557 (CAll 1983). The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit,
as shown in this case, follows the same rule except that it requires that the
employer's proof be clear and convincing rather than merely preponderant.
263 U.S. App. D. C. 321, 333-334, 825 F. 2d458, 470-471 (1987); see also
Toney v. Block, 227 U. S. App. D. C. 273,275; 705 F . 2d 1364, 1366 (1983)
(Scalia, J.) (it would be "destructive of the purposes of [Title VII] to require the plaintiff to establish . . . the difficult hypothetical proposition
that, had there been no discrimination, the employment decision would
have been made in his favor"). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
also requires clear and convincing proof, but it goes further by holding that
a Title VII violation is made out as soon as the plaintiff shows that an impermissible motivation played a part in an employment decision-at which
point the employer may avoid reinstatement and an award of backpay by
proving that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
unlawful motive. See, e. g. Fadhl v. City and County of San Fmncisco,
741 F. 2d 1163, 1165-1166 (CA9 1984) (Kennedy, J.) ("significant factor").
Last, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit draws the same distinction as the Ninth between the liability and remedial phases of Title VII litigation, but requires only a preponderance of the evidence from the employer. See, e. g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F. 2d 1318, 1320-1324 (CA8 1985)
(en bane) ("discernible factor'').
1
We disregard, for purposes of this discussion, the special context of
affirmative action.
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The converse, therefore, of "for cause" legislation,' Title VII
eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees
while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice.
This balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives turns out to be decisive in the case before us.
Congress' intent to forbid employers to take gender into
account in making employment decisions appears on the face
of the statute. In now-familiar language, the statute forbids
an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"
or to ''limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's ... sex." 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2)
(emphasis added). 5 We take these words to mean that
gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions. To construe the words ''because of" as colloquial shorthand for "butfor causation," as does Price Waterhouse, is to misunder' Congress specifically declined to require that an employment decision
have been ''for cause" in order to escape an affirmative penalty (such as
reinstatement or backpay) from a court. As introduced in the House, the
bill that became Title VII forbade such affirmative relief if an "individual
was ... refused employment or advancement, or was suspended or discharged/or cause." H. R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1963) (emphasis
added). The phrase "for cause" eventually was deleted in favor of the
phrase ''for any reason other than" one of the enumerated characteristics.
See 110 Cong. Rec. 2567-2571 (1964). Representative Celler explained
that this substitution "specif[ied] cause"; in his view, a court "cannot find
any violation of the act which is based on facts other ... than discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin." Id., at
2567.
6
In this Court, Hopkins for the first time argues that Price Waterhouse
violated § 703(a)(2) when it subjected her to a biased decisionmaking process that ''tended to deprive" a woman of partnership on the basis of her
sex. Since Hopkins did not make this argument below, we do not address
it.
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stand them. 6
But-for causation is a hypothetical construct. In determining whether a particular factor was a but-for cause of a
given event, we begin by assuming that that factor was
present at the time of the event, and then ask whether, even
if that factor had been absent, the event nevertheless would
have transpired in the same way. The present, active tense
of the operative verbs of § 703(a)(l) ("to fail or refuse"), in
contrast, turns our attention to the actual moment of the
event in question, the adverse employment decision. The
critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of
§ 703(a)(l), is whether gender was a factor in the employment
decision at the rrwment it was made. Moreover, since we
know that the words "because of" do not mean "solely because of," 7 we also know that Title VII meant to condemn
even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. When, therefore, an employer
considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of
making a decision, that decision was "because of" sex and the
other, legitimate considerations-even if we may say later, in
the context of litigation, that the decision would have been
the same if gender had not been taken into account.
•we made passing reference to a similar question in McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Trans-portation Co., 427 U. S. 273, 282, n. 10 (1976), where
we stated that when a Title VII plaintiff seeks to show that an employer's
explanation for a challenged employment decision is pretextual, "no more
is required to be shown than that race was a 'but for' cause." This passage, however, does not suggest that the plaintiff must show but-for cause;
it indicates only that if she does so, she prevails. More important, McDonald dealt with the question whether the employer's stated reason for
its decision was the reason for its action; unlike the case before us today,
therefore, McDonald did not involve mixed motives. This difference is
decisive in distinguishing this case from those involving "pretext." See
infra, at 16.
1
Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have placed
the word "solely" in front of the words ''because of." 110 Cong. Rec. 2728,
13837 (1964).
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To attribute this meaning to the words "because of" does
not, as the dissent asserts, post, at 4, divest them of causal
significance. A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose two physical forces act upon and move an object, and
suppose that either force acting alone would have moved the
object. As the dissent would have it, neither physical force
was a "cause" of the motion unless we can show that but for
one or both of them, the object would not have moved; to use
the dissent's terminology, both forces were simply "in the
air" unless we can identify at least one of them as a but-for
cause of the object's movement. Post, at 13. Events that
are causally overdetermined, in other words, may not have
any "cause" at all. This cannot be so.
We need not leave our commonsense at the doorstep when
we interpret a statute. It is difficult for us to imagine that,
in the simple words "because of," Congress meant to obligate
a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision
she challenges. We conclude, instead, that Congress meant
to obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sexbased considerations in coming to its decision.
Our interpretation of the words ''because of" also is supported by the fact that Title VII does identify one circumstance in which an employer may take gender into account in
making an employment decision, namely, when gender is a
''bona fide occupational qualification [(BFOQ)] reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of th[e] particular business
or enterprise." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(e). The only plausible inference to draw from this provision is that, in all other
circumstances, a person's gender may not be considered in
making decisions that affect her. Indeed, Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling block to
employment opportunities. An employer may not, we have
held, condition employment opportunities on the satisfaction
of facially neutral tests or qualifications that have a disproportionate, adverse impact on members of protected groups
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when those tests or qualifications are not required for performance of the job. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust, 487 U. S. - - (1988); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
u. s. 424 (1971).
To say that an employer may not take gender into account
is not, however, the end of the matter, for that describes only
one aspect of Title VII. The other important aspect of the
statute is its preservation of an employer's remaining freedom of choice. We conclude that the preservation of this
freedom means that an employer shall not be liable if it can
prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it
would have come to the same decision regarding a particular
person. The statute's maintenance of employer prerogatives is evident from the statute itself and from its history,
both in Congress and in this Court.
To begin with, the existence of the BFOQ exception shows
Congress' unwillingness to require employers to change the
very nature of their operations in response to the statute.
And our emphasis on "business necessity'' in disparateimpact cases, see Watson and Griggs, and on "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason[s]" in disparate-treatment cases,
. see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 802
(1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U. S. 248 (1981), results from our awareness of Title VII's
balance between employee rights and employer prerogatives.
In McDonnell Douglas, we· described as follows Title VII's
goal to eradicate discrimination while preserving workplace
efficiency: "The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions. In the implementation of
such decisions, it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates
no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise." 411 U. S., at
801.
When an employer ignored the attributes enumerated in
the statute, Congress hoped, it naturally would focus on the
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qualifications of the applicant or employee. The intent to
drive employers to focus on qualifications rather than on
race, religion, sex, or national origin is the theme of a good
deal of the statute's legislative history. An interpretive
memorandum entered into the Congressional Record by Senators Case and Clark, comanagers of the bill in the Senate, is
representative of this general theme. 8 According to their
memorandum, Title VII "expressly protects the employer's
right to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or
white, must meet the applicable job qualifications. Indeed,
the very purpose of title VII is to promote hiring on the basis
of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or
color." 9 110 Cong. Rec. 7247 (1964), quoted in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., swpra, at 434. - -The mem_orandum went on:
"To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference
in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in
treatment or favor which are prohibited by section 704 are
those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria:
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Any other cri"We have in the past aclmowledged the authoritativeness of this interpretive memorandum, written by the two bipartisan "captains" of Title
VII. See, e. g., Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561, 581, n. 14 (1984).
9
Many of the legislators' statements, such as the memorandum quoted
in text, focused specifically on race rather than on gender or religion or national origin. We do not, however, limit their statements to the context of
race, but instead we take them as general statements on the meaning of
Title VII. The somewhat bizarre path by which "sex" came to be included
as a forbidden criterion for employment-it was included in an attempt to
defeat the bill, see C. & B. Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative
History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 115-117 (1985)-does not persuade us
that the legislators' statements pertaining to race are irrelevant to cases
alleging gender discrimination. The amendment that added "sex" as one
of the forbidden criteria for employment was passed, of course, and the
statute on its face treats each of the enumerated categories exactly the
same.
By the same token, our specific references to gender throughout this
opinion, and the principles we announce, apply with equal force to discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin.
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terion or qualification for employment is not affected by this
title." 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).
Many other legislators made statements to a similar effect;
we see no need to set out each remark in full here. The central point is this: while an employer may not take gender into
account in making an employment decision (except in those
very narrow circumstances in which gender is a BFOQ), it is
free to decide against a woman for other reasons. We think
these principles require that, once a plaintiff in a Title VII
case shows that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability10 only by proving that it would have made the same
Hopkins argues that once she made this showing, she was entitled to a
finding that Price Waterhouse had discriminated against her on the basis of
sex; as a consequence, she says, the partnership's proof could only limit the
relief she received. She relies on Title VII's § 706(g), which permits a
court to award affirmative relief when it finds that an employer ''has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice," and yet forbids a court to order reinstatement of, or backpay to,
"an individual . . . if such individual was refused . . . employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any rea.son other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U. S. C. § 2000-5(g) (emphasis added). We do not take this provision to
mean that a court inevitably can find a violation of the statute without having considered whether the employment decision would have been the
same absent the impermissible motive. That would be to interpret
§ 706(g)-a provision defining remedie.s-to influence the substantive commands of the statute. We think that this provision merely limits courts'
authority to award affirmative relief in those circumstances in which a violation of the statute is not dependent upon the effect of the employer's
discriminatory practices on a particular employee, as in pattern-or-practice
suits and class actions. "The crucial difference between an individual's
claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of discrimination is manifest. The inquiry regarding an individual's
claim is the reason for a particular employment decision, while 'at the liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be on individual hiring decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory decisionmaking.'"
Cooper v. Federal Re.serve Bank of Richmond, 467 U. S. 867, 876 (1984),
quoting Teamsters v. United State.s, 431 U. S. 324, 360, n. 46 (1977).
10

'
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decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.
This balance of burdens is the direct result of Title VII's balance of rights.
Our holding casts no shadow on Burdine, in which we decided that, even after a plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case of discrimination under Title.VII, the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that its stated
legitimate reason for the employment decision was the true
reason. 450 U. S., at 256-258. We stress, first, that neither court below shifted the burden of persuasion to Price
Waterhouse on this question, and in fact, the District Court
found that Hopkins had not shown that the firm's stated reason for its decision was pretextual. 618 F. Supp., at
1114-1115. Moreover, since we hold that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the issue whether gender
played a part in the employment decision, the situation before us is not the one of "shifting burdens" that we addressed
in Burdine. Instead, the employer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must
persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer,
if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another. See
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393,
400 (1983). 11
Without explicitly mentioning this portion of § 706(g), we have in the
past held that Title VII does not authorize affirmative relief for individuals
as to whom, the employer shows, the existence of systemic discrimination
had no effect. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747,
772 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 367-371 (1977); Ea.st
Texa.s Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodrigu.~z, 431 U. S. 395, 404, n. 9
(1977). These decisions suggest that the proper focus of § 706(g) is on
claims of systemic discrimination, not on charges of individual discrimination. Cf. NLRB v. Transporlation Ma.nagenumt Corp., 462 U. S. 393
(1983) (upholding the National Labor Relations Board's identical interpretation of§ lO(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 160(c),
which contains language almost identical to § 706(g)).
11
Given that both the plaintiff and defendant bear a burden of proof in
cases such as this one, it is surprising that the dissent insists that our approach requires the employer to bear "the ultimate burden of proof."
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Price Waterhouse's claim that the employer does not bear
any burden of proof (if it bears one at all) until the plaintiff
has shown "substantial evidence that Price Waterhouse's explanation for failing to promote Hopkins was not the 'true
reason' for its action" (Brief for Petitioner 20) merely restates its argument that the plaintiff in a mixed-motives case
must squeeze her proof into Burdine's framework. Where a
decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives, however, it simply makes no sense to ask
whether the legitimate reason was "the 'true reason'" (Brief
for Petitioner 20 (emphasis added)) for the decision-which is
the question asked by Burdine. See Transportation Management, supra, at 400, n. 5. 12 Oblivious to this last point,
Post, at 10. It is, moreover, perfectly consistent to say both that gender
was a factor in a particular decision when it was made and that, when the
situation is viewed hypothetically and after the fact, the same decision
would have been made even in the absence of discrimination. Thus, we do
not see the "internal inconsistency" in our opinion that the dissent perceives. See post, at 6-7. Finally, where liability is imposed because an
employer is unable to prove that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not discriminated, this is not an imposition of liability "where
sex made no difference to the outcome." Post, at 6. In our adversary
system, where a party has the burden of proving a particular assertion and
where that party is unable to meet its burden, we assume that that assertion is inaccurate. Thus, where an employer is unable to prove its claim
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination,
we are entitled to conclude that gender did make a difference to the
outcome.
a Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must be
correctly labeled as either a "pretext" case or a ''mb:ed motives" case from
the beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often
will allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both. Discovery often
will be necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and
illegitimate considerations played a part in the decision against her. At
some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide
whether a particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to
satisfy the factftnder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail
only if she proves, following Burdine, that the employer's stated reason for

;
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the dissent would insist that Burdine's framework perform
work that it was never intended to perform. It would require a plaintiff who challenges an adverse employment decision in which both legitimate and illegitimate considerations
played a part to pretend that the decision, in fact, stemmed
from a single source-for the premise of Bu1·dine is that
either a legitimate <Yt an illegitimate set of considerations led
to the challenged decision. To say that Bu1·dine's evidentiary scheme will not help us decide a case admittedly involving both kinds of considerations is not to cast aspersions on
the utility of that scheme in the circumstances for which it
was designed.

B
In deciding as we do today, we do not traverse new
ground. We have in the past confronted Title VII cases in
which an employer has used an illegitimate criterion to distinguish among employees, and have held that it is the employer's burden to justify decisions resulting from that practice.
When an employer has asserted that gender is a bona fide
occupational qualification within the meaning of§ 703(e), for
example, we have assumed that it is the employer who must
show why it must use gender as a criterion in employment.
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 332-337, (1977).
In a related context, although the Equal Pay Act expressly
permits employers to pay different wages to women where
disparate pay is the result of a "factor other than sex," see 29
U. S. C. § 206(d)(l), we have decided that it is the employer,
not the employee, who must prove that the actual disparity is
its decision is pretextuaL The dissent need not worry that this evidentiary scheme, if used during a jury trial, will be so impossibly confused and
complex as it imagines. See, e. g., post, at 13-14. Juries long have decided cases in which defendant.s raise affirmative defenses. The dissent
fails, moreover, to explain why the evidentiary scheme that we endorsed
over ten years ago in Mt. Healthy has not proved unworkable in that context but would be hopelessly complicated in a case brought under federal
antidiscrimination statutes.
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not sex-linked. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417
U. S. 188, 196 (1974). Finally, some courts have held that
under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, it is the employer who has the burden of showing that its
limitations on the work that it allows a pregnant woman to
perform are necessary in light of her pregnancy. See, e.g.,
Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F. 2d 1543, 1548
(CAll 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F . 2d 1172, 1187 (CA4
1982). As these examples demonstrate, our assumption always has been that if an employer allows gender to affect its
decisionmaking process, then it must carry the burden of justifying its ultimate decision. We have not in the past required women whose gender has proved relevant to an employment decision to establish the negative proposition that
they would not have been subject to that decision had they
been men, and we do not do so today.
We have reached a similar conclusion in other contexts
where the law announces that a certain characteristic is irrelevant to the allocation of burdens and benefits. In Mt.
Healthy City School Di,st. Board of Education v. Doyle, 429
U. S. 274 (1977), the plaintiff claimed that he had been discharged as a public school teacher for exercising his freespeech rights under the First Amendment. Because we did
not wish to "place an employee in a better position as a result
of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he
would have occupied had he done nothing," id., at 285, we
concluded that such an employee "ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record." Id., at 286. We therefore
held that once the plaintiff had shown that his constitutionally protected speech was a "substantial" or "motivating factor" in the adverse treatment of him by his employer, the employer was obligated to prove ''by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to
[the plaintiff] even in the absence of the protected conduct."
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Id., at 287. A court that finds for a plaintiff under this
standard has effectively concluded that an illegitimate motive
was a "but-for" cause of the employment decision. See
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439
U. S. 410, 417 (1979). See also Arlington Heights v. Met1·0politan Housing Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 270-271, n. 21 (1977)
(applying Mt. Healthy standard where plaintiff alleged that
unconstitutional motive had contributed to enactment of legislation); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S. 222, 228 (1985)
(same).
In Transportation Manage1nent, we upheld the NLRB's
interpretation of§ lO(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,
which forbids a court to order affirmative relief for discriminatory conduct against a union member "if such individual
was suspended or discharged for cause." 29 U. S. C.
§ 160(c). The Board had decided that this provision meant
that once an employee had shown that his suspension or discharge was based in part on hostility to unions, it was up to
the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of
this impermissible motive. In such a situation, we emphasized, "[t]he employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a
motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute. It is fair
that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the
risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity
but by his own wrongdoing." 462 U. S. , at 403.
We have, in short, been here before. Each time, we have
concluded that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible
motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment
decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the burden to
show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive. Our decision today treads this
well-worn path.
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C
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at
the moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we
received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be
that the applicant or employee was a woman. 18 In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that
she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.
Although the parties do not overtly dispute this last proposition, the placement by Price Waterhouse of "sex stereotyping" in quotation marks throughout its brief seems to us an
insinuation either that such stereotyping was not present in
this case or that it lacks legal relevance. We reject both possibilities. As to the existence of sex stereotyping in this
case, we are not inclined to quarrel with the District Court's
conclusion that a number of the partners' comments showed
sex stereotyping at work. See infra, at 25-26. As for the
legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group, for "'[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'" Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707,
n. 13 (1978), quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971). An employer who objects to
13
After comparing this description of the plaintiff's proof to that offered
by the concurring opinion, post, at 16,, we do not understand why the concurrence suggests that they are meaningfully different from each other,
see post, at 15, 17-18. Nor do we see how the inquiry that we have described is "hypothetical," see post, at 5, n. 1. It seeks to determine the
content of the entire set of reasons for a decision, rather than shaving off
one reason in an attempt to determine what the decision would have been
in the absence of that consideration. The inquiry that we describe thus
strikes us as a distinctly non-hypothetical one.
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aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this
trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible Catch22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they don't. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not
inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision. The plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.
In making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly
be evidence that gender played a part. In any event, the
stereotyping in this case did not simply consist of stray remarks. On the contrary, Hopkins proved that Price
Waterhouse invited partners to submit comments; that some
of the comments stemmed from sex stereotypes; that an important part of the Policy Board's decision on Hopkins was an
assessment of the submitted comments; and that Price
Waterhouse in no way disclaimed reliance on the sex-linked
evaluations. This is not, as Price Waterhouse suggests,
"discrimination in the air"; rather, it is, as Hopkins puts it,
"discrimination brought to ground and visited upon" an employee. Brief for Respondent 30. By focusing on Hopkins'
specific proof, however, we do not suggest a limitation on the
possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision, and we refrain from deciding here which specific facts, "standing alone," would or
would not establish a plaintiff's case, since such a decision is
unnecessary in this case. But see post, at 17 (JUSTICE
O'CONNOR, concurring in judgment).
As to the employer's proof, in most cases, the employer
should be able to present some objective evidence as to its
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive. 14
"JUSTICE WHITE's suggestion, post, at 3, that the employer's own testimony as to the probable decision in the absence of discrimination is due
special credence where the court has, contrary to the employer's testimony, found that an illegitimate factor played a part in the decision, is
baffling.
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Moreover, proving ''that the same decision would have been
justified ... is not the same as proving that the same decision would have been made." Givhan, 439 U. S., at 416,
quoting Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District,
555 F . 2d 1309, 1315 (CA5 1977). An employer may not, in
other words, prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason
did not motivate it at the time of the decision. Finally, an
employer may not meet its burden in such a case by merely
showing that at the time of the decision it was motivated only
in part by a legitimate reason. The very premise of a mixedmotives case is that a legitimate reason was present, and indeed, in this case, Price Waterhouse already has made this
showing by convincing Judge Gesell that Hopkins' interpersonal problems were a legitimate concern. The employer instead must show that its legitimate reason, standing alone,
would have induced it to make the same decision.
III
The courts below held that an employer who has allowed a
discriminatory impulse to play a motivating part in an employment decision must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision in the absence of discrimination. We are persuaded that the better
rule is that the employer must make this showing by a preponderance of the evidence.
Conventional rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title
VII cases, see, e.g., United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716 (1983) (discrimination
not to be "treat[ed] ... differently from other ultimate questions of fact"), and one of these rules is that parties to civil
litigation need only prove their case by a preponderance of
the evidence. See, e. g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 390 (1983). Exceptions to this standard
are uncommon, and in fact are ordinarily recognized only
when the government seeks to take unusual coercive action-
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action more dramatic than entering an award of money damages or other conventional relief-against an individual. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 756 (1982) (termination
of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 427
(1979) (involuntary commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U. S.
276 (1966) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U. S. 118, 122, 125 (1943) (denaturalization). Only rarely
have we required clear and convincing proof where the action
defended against seeks only conventional relief, see, e. g.,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 342 (1974) (defamation), and we find it significant that in such cases it was
the defendant rather than the plaintiff who sought the elevated standard of proof-suggesting that this ·standard ordinarily serves as a shield rather than, as Hopkins seek_s t_o use
it, as a sword.
It is true, as Hopkins emphasizes, that we have noted the
"clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to
establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage
and the measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix
the amount." Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555, 562 (1931). Likewise, an EEOC
regulation does require federal agencies proved to have violated Title VII to show by clear and convincing evidence that
an individual employee is not entitled to relief. See 29 CFR
§ 1613.271(c)(2) (1988). And finally, it is true that we have
emphasized the importance of make-whole relief for victims
of discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U. S. 405 (1975). Yet each of these sources deals with the
proper determination of relief rather than with the initial
finding of liability. This is seen most easily in the EEOC's
regulation, which operates only after an agency or the EEOC
has found that "an employee of the agency was discriminated
against." See 29 CFR § 1613.271(c) (1988). Because we
have held that, by proving that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of discrimination, the employer may
avoid a finding of liability altogether and not simply avoid
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certain equitable relief, these authorities do not help Hopkins
to show why we should elevate the standard of proof for an
employer in this position.
Significantly, the cases from this Court that most resemble
this one, Mt. Healthy and Transpm-tation Management, did
not require clear and convincing proof. Mt. Healthy, 429
U. S., at 287; TranspO?-tation Management, 462 U. S., at
400, 403. We are not inclined to say that the public policy
against firing employees because they spoke out on issues of
public concern or because they affiliated with a union is less
important than the policy against discharging employees on
the basis of their gender. Each of these policies is vitally
important, and each is adequately served by requiring proof
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Although Price Waterhouse does not concretely tell us how
its proof was preponderant even if it was not clear and convincing, this general claim is implicit in its request for the
less stringent standard. Since the lower courts required
Price Waterhouse to make its proof by clear and convincing
evidence, they did not determine whether Price Waterhouse
had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have placed Hopkins' candidacy on hold even if it had not permitted sex-linked evaluations to play a part in the decisionmaking process. Thus, we shall remand this case so that
that determination can be made.

IV
The District Court found that sex stereotyping "was permitted to play a part" in the evaluation of Hopkins as a candidate for partnership. 618 F. Supp., at 1120. Price
Waterhouse disputes both that stereotyping occurred and
that it played any part in the decision to place Hopkins' candidacy on hold. In the firm's view, in other words, the District
Court's factual conclusions are clearly erroneous. We do not
agree.
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In finding that some of the partners' comments reflected
sex stereotyping, the District Court relied in part on Dr.
Fiske's expert testimony. Without directly impugning Dr.
Fiske's credentials or qualifications, Price Waterhouse insinuates that a social psychologist is unable to identify sex
stereotyping in evaluations without investigating whether
those evaluations have a basis in reality. This argument
comes too late. At trial, counsel for Price Waterhouse twice
assured the court that he did not question Dr. Fiske's expertise (App. 25) and failed to challenge the legitimacy of her discipline. Without contradiction from Price Waterhouse,
Fiske testified that she discerned sex stereotyping in the
partners' evaluations of Hopkins and she further explained
that it was part of her business to identify stereotyping in
written documents. Id., at 64. We are not inclined to accept petitioner's belated and unsubstantiated characterization of Dr. Fiske's testimony as "gossamer evidence" (Brief
for Petitioner 20) based only on "intuitive hunches" (id., at
44) and of her detection of sex stereotyping as "intuitively divined" (id., at 43). Nor are we disposed to adopt the dissent's dismissive attitude toward Dr. Fiske's field of study
and toward her own professional integrity, see post, at 15,
n. 5.

Indeed, we are tempted to say that Dr. Fiske's expert testimony was merely icing on Hopkins' cake. It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an
aggressive female employee as requiring "a course at charm
school." Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer's memorable advice
to Hopkins, does it require expertise in psychology to know
that, if an employee's flawed "interpersonal skills" can be
corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills
that has drawn the criticism. 16
We reject the claim, advanced by Price Waterhouse here and by the
dissenting judge below, that the District Court clearly erred in finding that
Beyer was "responsible for telling [Hopkins] what problems the Policy
11
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Price Waterhouse also charges that Hopkins produced no
evidence that sex stereotyping played a role in the decision to
place her candidacy on hold. As we have stressed, however,
Hopkins showed that the partnership solicited evaluations
from all of the firm's partners; that it generally relied very
heavily on such evaluations in making its decision; that some
of the partners' comments were the product of stereotyping;
and that the firm in no way disclaimed reliance on those particular comments, either in Hopkins' case or in the past.
Certainly a plausible-and, one might say, inevitable-conclusion to draw from this set of circumstances is that the
Policy Board in making its decision did in fact take into account all of the partners' comments, including the comments
that were motivated by stereotypical notions about women's
proper deportment. 16
Price Waterhouse concedes that the proof in Transportation Management, supra, adequately showed that the employer there had relied on an impermissible motivation in firing the plaintiff. Brief for Petitioner 45. But the only
evidence in that case that a discriminatory motive contributed to the plaintiff's discharge was that the employer harbored a grudge toward the plaintiff on account of his union
activity; there was, contrary to Price Waterhouse's suggestion, no direct evidence that that grudge had played a role in
Board had identified with her candidacy." 618 F. Supp., at 1117. This
conclusion was reasonable in light of the testimony at trial of a member of
both the Policy Board and the Admissions Committee, who stated that he
had "no doubt" that Beyer would discuss with Hopkins the reasons for placing her candidacy on hold and that Beyer ''knew exactly where the problems were" regarding Hopkins. Tr. 316.
18
We do not understand the dissenters' dissatisfaction with the District
Judge's statements regarding the failure of Price Waterhouse to "sensitize"
partners to the dangers of sexism. Post, at 15-16. Made in the context
of determining that Price Waterhouse had not disclaimed reliance on sexbased evaluations, and following the judge's description of the firm's history of condoning such evaluations, the judge's remarks seem to us
justified.
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the decision, and in fact, the employer had given other reasons in explaining the plaintiff's discharge. See 462 U. S., at
396. If the partnership considers that proof sufficient, we do
not know why it takes such vehement issue with Hopkins'
proof.
Nor is the finding that sex stereotyping played a part in
the Policy Board's decision undermined by the fact that many
of the suspect coµiments were made by supporters rather
than detractors of Hopkins. A negative comment, even
when made in the context of a generally favorable review,
nevertheless may influence the decisionmaker to think less
highly of the candidate; the Policy Board, in fact, did not simply tally the "yes's" and "no's" regarding a candidate, but
carefully reviewed the content of the submitted comments.
The additional suggestion that the comments were made by
"persons outside the decisionmaking chain" (Brief for Petitioner 48)-and therefore could not have harmed Hopkinssimply ignores the critical role that partners' comments
played in the Policy Board's partnership decisions.
Price Waterhouse appears to think that we cannot affirm
the factual findings of the trial court without deciding that,
instead of being overbearing and aggressive and curt, Hopkins is in fact kind and considerate and patient. If this is
indeed its impression, petitioner misunderstands the theory
on which Hopkins prevailed. The District Judge acknowledged that Hopkins' conduct justified complaints about her
behavior as a senior manager. But he also concluded that
the reactions of at least some of the partners were reactions
to her as a woman manager. Where an evaluation is based
on a subjective assessment of a person's strengths and weaknesses, it is simply not true that each evaluator will focus on,
or even mention, the same weaknesses. Thus, even if we
knew that Hopkins had "personality problems," this would
not tell us that the partners who cast their evaluations of
Hopkins in sex-based terms would have criticized her as
sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had been a man. It is
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not our job to review the evidence and decide that the negative reactions to Hopkins were based on reality; our perception of Hopkins' character is irrelevant. We sit not to determine whether Ms. Hopkins is nice, but to decide whether the
partners reacted negatively to her personality because she is
a woman.
V
We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves
that her gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only
by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not taken the
plaintiff's gender into account. Because the courts below
erred by deciding that the defendant must make this proof by
clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment against Price Waterhouse on liability and
remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.

